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Table of Contents of main report.
FM 100-6 INFORMATION OPERATIONS
This appendix illustrates and explains how IO and C2W could be incorporated into a basic plan or order. The OPLAN format is used for this illustration. Annex A provides a sample campaign plan model and identifies the key annexes related to IO support. Annex B illustrates how a C2W annex is written.
Commanders use operations, administrative, and logistics plans and orders to convey information and instructions to subordinate units. Plans and orders are similar in format and content. Although a plan may be effective immediately for planning purposes or for specified preparatory action, it is not executed until the commander so directs, usually when certain specified conditions, as set forth in the plan, are determined to exist. A plan specifies the time or conditions under which it is to be placed in effect.
A plan becomes an order when execution is directed. An order carries with it the obligation of immediate execution at a specified time or date. The major difference between a plan and an order is that a plan normally contains assumptions. See Chapter 6 for general information about planning and execution.
MAJOR OPERATION PLAN: (Number or code name)
References: Maps, charts, and other documents
TASK ORGANIZATION/COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.
1. SITUATION. Integrate tactical considerations important to IO in the early phases of an operation into the overall description of the operational situation. Refer to command and staff estimates, country studies, or OPLANs. Indicate trigger events that would signal execution of specific components to an IO within the OPORD.
b. Friendly Forces. Provide information on friendly forces that may affect the execution of the IO plan being put forth. These effects may impact directly on the command or on organizations subordinate to the command.
c. Attachments and Detachments. List attachments and detachments here.
d. Assumptions. Integrate a summary of the conditions and situations that must exist to enhance IO.
2. MISSION. Address IO to the degree necessary to fully state the overall operational mission.
3. EXECUTION.
b. Concept of Operations. Include a clear, concise statement of implied or specified IO tasks to be achieved in all phases of the major operation. One example is legitimizing an overall campaign through IO to prepare the people in the adversary country to accept results of the operation, particularly if it could be viewed with bitterness. Summarize IO tasks assigned by the CINC and other informational tasks derived from the commander's analysis of the environment and his understanding of his superiors' intent. At the operational level, the concept of operation is usually divided into phases.
(b) Using diplomatic and interagency support to assist in transferring status of forces agreements, constraints (Annex E), and ROE (Annex F) for the proposed operation with participating nations (in coordination with DOS and appropriate embassies and country teams).
(c) Establishing INFOSYS forward to establish C2 and to assist in establishing or preparing intermediate staging bases in the target region and directing the repositioning of supplies and equipment.
(d) Using CA, PSYOP, and PA to support political and diplomatic initiatives.
(e) Transmitting the commander's intent and scheme of operational maneuver, including close battle, deep battle, and rear security operations to ensure simultaneous understanding and execution of complex operations by all participants.
(f) Supporting operational fires with IO such as EW and appropriate C4I architectures. This support assists complex arrangements for fire support (Annex G), including joint and multinational employment of fires and targeting.
(g) Determining IO support to civil affairs (Annex T), air defense (Annex H), EW and ES (Annex D, Appendix B), PSYOP (Annex D, Appendix D), and rear operations (Annex L), protection of forces and means (Annex M), provost marshal functions (Annex N), PA (Annex O), and space operations (Annex P).
(h) Developing IO branches and sequels.
(i) Providing coordinating instructions applicable to two or more subordinate elements executing IO. Also include instructions for informational linkups with SOF or ground units involved in the deep battle.
(2) Phase II. The second operational phase is usually the execution of the operation itself. Address those aspects of IO that play a major role in supporting this phase.
(b) Set forth the scheme of maneuver, as well as the deployment scheme, of IO units to attain initial objectives. The scheme should include, where appropriate, the forcible insertion of combat elements and necessary C2 elements and their accompanying support. Address--
2. Changes in the nature of the operation.
3. Major regrouping of informational forces.
4. Significant changes in enemy capabilities that would affect the informational units necessary in the operation.
(c) In the fire support subparagraph or its annex, address joint interfaces such as the joint targeting board (JTB) and the battlefield coordination element (BCE) and the IO considerations bearing on such interfaces.
(d) Include IO provisions for CA (Annex T), air defense (Annex H), EW and ES (Annex D, Appendix D), PSYOP (Annex D, Appendix D) and rear operations (Annex L), protection of forces and means (Annex M), provost marshal functions (Annex N), PA (Annex O), and space operations (Annex P).
(e) As necessary, state the location and tasks for IO elements held in reserve.
(f) Include coordinating instructions that apply to two or more subordinate elements executing IO. Also include link-up procedures through IO between the force and forces already in the operation, if appropriate.
(3) Phase III. The third operational phase is usually the consolidation of the results of a successful end state for this phase. It does not contain the detail of the preceding phases. Address supporting IO as appropriate.
c. Tasks for Major Subordinate Commands. Ensure that IO are addressed as appropriate for each major subordinate command.
d. Coordinating Instructions. Integrate instructions on C2W whenever two or more phases of the operation are affected. Coordinating instructions may include the following:
(2) Constraints (Annex E). IO in situations other than war are usually constrained significantly by factors other than strictly military ones. Describe such limitations on IO on military actions in the same annex detailing the provisions of treaties, agreements, and conventions governing the political, military, and informational limits on the military effort.
(3) Rules of engagement (Annex F). In addition to constraints imposed by international agreement, certain self-imposed ROE govern the use of military forces and certain weapons effects during the major operation. These rules may affect the use of EMS, computer networks, and interference with space-based communications and other signals.
(4) Resource management guidance that may limit IO (for example, limited communications circuits, limited equipment availability, or limited access to networks).
(5) Training guidance concerning IO procedures (for example, PSYOP, CA). Refer to a separate annex (Annex Q).
(6) Operational planning guidance involving IO.
(7) Space operations planning guidance (Annex P) providing enhancements to IO.
(8) Public affairs operations (Annex O).
4. SUPPORT. Insert specific information as to how IO support Army elements involved in an operation. In this paragraph or in a support annex (Annex R), the ARFOR commander includes IO among descriptions of those support matters necessary to accomplish the combat mission of his force. The IO support plan phases must coincide with OPLAN phases.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
b. Signal. As a minimum, list the current communications-electronics operations instructions (CEOI) index. These instructions can refer to an annex but should include rules concerning the use of communications and other electronic equipment (for example, radio silence).
ANNEXES: In recognition of the expanding contribution that IO can make to the accomplishment of the overall mission, OPLAN annexes have been reorganized by creating a new C2W Annex that consolidates the traditional annexes dealing with deception, EW, and PSYOP.
A Task Organization/Command Relationships. In a plan for a major operation composed of several phases, within this annex, identify and integrate the task organization required to conduct IO. Outline command relationships and their changes, if any, as the IO progresses from one phase to the next. Include information-specific task organizations for Army component support to contingencies in the annexes referring to the plans for those operations. Relate the informational structure against interfaces expected with the following activities involved in the operation:
b. Multinational Force Relationships. Host nations, allies, forces from regional/treaty organizations.
c. Joint Relationships. DOD agencies (DIA, NSA, DISA), unified and specified commands (subunified commands and joint task forces when appropriate), other services in uniservice roles.
d. Other Army Forces. The informational structure that enables connectivity from the highest level army component participating in operations down to the lowest level, including:
(2) Functional commands.
(3) Area commands.
(4) Major combat and combat support organizations directly under full theater army command in peacetime.
(5) Army organizations providing EAC support to the BCE and air combat elements.
(6) ARSOF, especially deployable informational structures, to include PSYOP, SF, and supporting communications units.
B Intelligence. This annex should incorporate critical information needed to support IO and integrate those elements into the larger overview of the enemy situation. Detailed information needed to conduct C2W operations should be further developed in the C2W Annex.
C Operations Overlay. This annex is a graphic representation of the concept of operations.
D C2W Annex. The C2W annex focuses on providing the necessary information to conduct C2W operations and consolidates all information previously found in the annexes dealing with deception (formerly Annex D), EW (formerly Annex I), and PSYOP (formerly Annex K). The intent is to integrate all aspects of C2W to best identify and synchronize the application of available capabilities to achieve the overall mission. A sample C2W Annex is provided in Annex B of this appendix.
E Constraints. This annex contains those political, humanitarian, economic, and social/cultural limitations on applying military power during the operation.
F Rules of Engagement. This annex contains guidelines to subordinate and supporting organizations regarding the rules for the control of forces and their weapons systems, to include guidance on the conduct of IO.
G Fire Support. This annex contains a statement of the fire support operations to be carried out, to include major groupings of fire support means and priorities and the integration of nuclear, chemical, and conventional fires, as appropriate.
H Air Defense. This annex should state the air defense operation to be carried out, to include air defense priorities and reference to the deployment overlays appendix. It should contain the allocation of counterair units, tasks, and coordinating instructions.
I Not Used.
J Engineer. This annex should include a statement of how the engineering support is to be carried out, to include priorities of mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks within sectors and priority of uncommitted engineering resources to subordinate units or sectors.
K Not Used.
L Rear Operations. This annex contains guidance and priorities for securing the rear areas and facilities to prevent or minimize enemy interference, disruption of combat support and service support, or movement of friendly troops. It designates a unit to find, fix, and destroy enemy incursions into the rear area and provides area damage control after an attack or incident.
M Protection. This annex contains instructions for the protection of bases, installations, military personnel, family members, and other US nationals in the theater from terrorism, natural disasters, and other dangers. It also contains information on protection of C4I architecture.
N Provost Marshal. This annex prioritizes the four MP battlefield missions: area security, battlefield circulation control, enemy prisoner-of-war operations, and law enforcement. It should specify any tasks and/or coordinating instructions not covered in the OPORD.
O Public Affairs. This annex contains guidance for facilitating the media effort to cover the operation and for supporting the information needs of soldiers and their families. While PA is clearly a part of IO, it is addressed in its own annex since it falls outside C2W as defined by joint doctrine.
P Space Operations. This annex describes planned and available space support to the OPLAN. It explains how to obtain and coordinate space support and lists operational constraints and shortfalls. This annex is linked to space-based systems such as communications and, as such, is closely related to IO.
Q Training. This annex contains guidance for multinational, joint, and service training of individuals and units assigned or attached to the theater army, which includes liaison teams and other forms of connectivity that enable coalition C4I.
R Support. This annex spells out in detail the necessary support for subordinate formations to accomplish their missions. It may include special instructions for INFOSYS support of software support, configuration support, evacuating criteria, repair criteria, and so forth.
S Communications-Electronics. This annex describes the link provided by the force headquarters between the ATCCS, which exists among its subordinate units and joint and multinational C2 systems, as well as those of the sustaining base. It addresses INFOSYS and must be carefully coordinated with C2W operations.
T Civil Affairs. This annex describes civil affairs operations and organizations that affect the overall operation. It specifies how CA activities can provide relevant information supporting the CCIR from nontraditional sources in the GIE. While CA is clearly a part of IO, it is addressed in its own annex since it falls outside C2W as defined by joint doctrine.
Annex D to ( ) Corps OPORD Exercise Xxxx Xxxx
Command and Control Warfare (U)
(U) REFERENCES: List appropriate joint and Army publications or documents on IO such as the following:
b. CJCS MOP 6, Electronic Warfare, 3 March 1993.
c. Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare Operations, 7 February 1996.
d. Joint Pub 3-51, Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations, 30 June 1991.
e. Joint Pub 3-53, Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine, 30 July 1993.
f. Joint Pub 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security, 27 August 1991 (Change 1, 14 April 1994).
g. Joint Pub 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, 6 June 1994.
h. FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare, 27 September 1994.
1. (U) SITUATION. Thoroughly describe the operational environment as it applies to IO, as well as appropriate aspects of the strategic environment that may impact IO. Include tactical considerations important to IO in the early phases of an operation and establish the adversary's most probable C2-attack course of action. Indicate trigger events that would signal execution of specific components of an IO within the OPORD.
(b) Specific, localized information, particularly about conditions affecting the early phases of the operation. Include availability of advanced technologies within the area such as national, multinational, or commercial information networks (telephone, telegraph, television, satellite linkages, and frequency spectrum), and the value of protecting or disrupting key capabilities of the country.
(2) A description of the adversary, which consists of--
(b) Factors of immediate concern during the early phases of the operation are dispersal of information equipment within the country and locations of qualified repair, broadcast, and production technicians and operators. Additional factors are the adversary's use of space-based communications, navigation, imagery, and weather systems, as well as C2 W capabilities. Understanding the origin of the technology base enables easier disruption of the adversary's systems.
(c) Information about affiliations of the adversary that could counter US efforts against the adversary. Include order-of-battle information, numbers of INFOSYS, personalities of leaders, and levels of training or combat experience.
b. Friendly. State the mission and applicable parts of the concept of operation as it applies to IO/IW of the joint or multinational command to which the ARFOR is subordinate. These are normally as written in the theater campaign plan. Provide sufficient detail so that key individuals know and understand the higher joint or multinational commander's intent, the end state desired at the conclusion of the campaign, and how their actions mesh with the attainment of joint or multinational goals.
(2) Other service components. Highlight the roles of the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps components of the unified command in IO/IW.
(3) Joint, unified, and subunified commands and DOD agencies. Highlight the roles of these other commands and agencies that affect IO.
(4) Multinational forces. Highlight the organization, capabilities, and activities of friendly nations in the operation as they affect IO. Emphasize the capabilities of their military forces and other assets that their participation may bring. State their roles and missions that support the CINC's objectives to further US policies.
(5) Special operations forces. Describe the activities of SOF in the region that affect the operation, to include expected information activities of these forces.
(6) Department of State. Highlight the contributions of US embassies and country teams as they support IO of the force.
(7) Other Non-DOD US Agencies. Describe the activities of US Government agencies not included in country teams, such as DEA and USAID, as they affect IO.
c. Attachments and Detachments. Highlight critical elements of the Task Organization/Command Relationship section (Annex A) that may provide additional capabilities as the IO unfolds.
d. Assumptions. Include predictions and presumptions concerning the following:
(2) Previous US policies in the region that affect speed or ability to change informational themes.
(3) Involvement by other powers, both outside and within the region, in the internal affairs of nations in the theater, which could result in changes to IO.
(4) Effects of US actions in IO on relations with nations adjacent to the adversary nation.
(5) Adequacy of interagency support, to include methods of increasing the role of other information agencies to reduce, where possible, sole military contributions.
(6) Bilateral and multilateral consensus on the degree or extent of IO conducted within the overall operation.
(7) Availability of informational resources.
(8) Times and locations of anticipated hostile actions as they affect IO.
(9) The timing of political decisions in friendly nations that could change the IO scheme.
(10) The timing of the use of special events in the IO.
2. (U) MISSION. Include an explicit statement of the C2W mission to support the operation, such as the following: On order, ( ) Corps conducts C2W operations to deter (country name) attack on (country name). If deterrence fails, D-Day, H-Hour ( ) Corps conducts C2W operations to support combat operations to disrupt (country name) C2 of operational forces and degrade situational awareness of ( ) Corps operations, while protecting coalition C2 capabilities from enemy disruption and destruction.
3. (U) EXECUTION.
(2) Electronic Warfare. This appendix includes the EW mission, enemy EW capabilities, defensive and offensive EW measures, and coordination with other parts of the OPLAN (deception, communications, PSYOP, operational fires). See Appendix B to this annex.
(3) Operations Security. Deny the enemy information concerning the speed and size of the US buildup, as well as the specific course of action the US will execute in the decisive combat phase. Emphasis in initial stages is on denying the enemy access to his own or foreign intelligence capabilities. Deception, PSYOP, EW, and physical destruction all support these objectives. See Appendix C to this annex.
(4) Psychological Operations. This annex refers to the intelligence annex, designates PSYOP targets, and describes the PSYOP plan, to include its integration into higher headquarters plans and any deception plan operations or related tasks for subordinate units. See Appendix D to this annex.
(5) Physical Destruction. When employed in a C2W role, physical destruction is used to destroy the enemy's communications, integrated air defense system (IADS), and intelligence collection and fusion capabilities and to destroy the enemy's ability to strike at friendly C2 and C2W capabilities.
b. C2W Tasks. Review specified and unspecified tasks by command.
(b) Ensure that C2W cell responsibilities are accomplished as described in CJCSI 3210.03.
(c) Advise component and supporting commanders of (_) Corps C2W objectives and provide guidelines for their accomplishment.
(d) Develop the joint restricted frequency list (JRFL) to support operations.
(e) Provide oversight and ensure coordination of any reprogramming actions.
(2) Component and Supporting Commands.
(b) Plan for and be prepared to conduct C2W operations.
(c) Identify any operations that may impact or degrade effective C2 of coalition forces.
(d) Recommend to (_) Corps the intelligence collection requirements necessary to support C2W operations.
(e) Direct reprogramming actions as required.
c. Coordinating Instructions.
(2) Planning and support of C2W operations for (_) Corps should, as appropriate, be coordinated and draw support from the following:
(b) US Special Operations Command.
(c) National Security Agency.
(d) Central Intelligence Agency.
(e) Defense Intelligence Agency
(f) Land Information Warfare Activity.
4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.
(2) See Annex .
b. Logistics. Increasingly, all operations entail another service, such as the Navy or Air Force, providing some common support. During these operations, the lack of specific standard support structures may be overcome through enhanced information connectivity available through common data bases and common hardware or software available across the services or through liaison teams.
(b) Telemedicine support reducing the number of specialized staff deployed to an operational area.
(c) State of the art radio and television studios located out of the immediate operational area that could be used in PSYOP.
(d) Local production of newspapers that could facilitate PSYOP while reducing support infrastructures within an AO.
(2) Identify information network support facilities from friendly third countries. Set forth in detail the procedures for making use of these resources.
(3) Include procedures for IO support of contingency forces from CONUS or other theaters.
(4) Highlight IO that routinely support force sustainment, to include the operation of temporary installations.
5. (U) COMMAND AND CONTROL.
b. See Annex S.
APPENDIXES:
B Electronic Warfare
C Operations Security
D Psychological Operations
Table of Contents of main report.